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The Author of Roe
by RADHIKA RAO*
Justice Harry A. Blackmun was widely known as the author of
Roe v. Wade,' a decision he was assigned to write in just his second
year on the Supreme Court. The landmark case of our generation,
Roe v. Wade has been used as a litmus test for candidates for judicial
office,2 and it has also served as a lightning rod for modem constitu-
tional law, compared frequently3 to both the reviled decision in Loch-
ner v. New York' and the celebrated desegregation case, Brown v.
* Associate Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. A.B.
1986, J.D. 1990 Harvard. The author clerked for Justice Blackmun in October Term 1992.
This is a written version of a talk presented at the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly's
symposium, The Jurisprudence of Justice Harry A. Blackmun. The piece has benefited im-
mensely from the insightful comments and questions of all of those who participated in this
symposium. Thanks are also due to my librarian Mary Glennon and my students Deborah
King and John O'Connor for their excellent research assistance.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. See, eg., Nomination of Robert H. Bork To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, Hearings Before the Committee on The Judiciary of the United
States Senate, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 15-30, 1987); Nomination of David H. Souter to
be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearings Before the Commit-
tee on The Judiciary of the United States Senate, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 13-19, 1990);
Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, Hearings Before the Committee on The Judiciary of the United States Senate,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 10-16, 1991); Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be Associ-
ate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearings Before the Committee on The
Judiciary of the United States Senate, 103d Cong., 1st Seas. (July 20-23,1993); Nomination of
Stephen G. Bryer to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
Hearings Before the Committee on The Judiciary of the United States Senate, 103d Cong., 2d
sess. (July 12-15, 1994).
3. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-64 (1992) (declaring that
"the sustained and widespread debate Roe has provoked calls for some comparison be-
tween that case and others of comparable dimension that have responded to national con-
troversies," namely Lochner and Brown); ROBERT H. BORK, Tim TEMPTING OF AMERICA:
THE POLITICAL SEDUCrION OF Tri LAW 32 (1990) (comparing Roe to Lochner and Dred
Scott v. Sandford); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 940 (1973) (suggesting that "Lochner and Roe are twins").
4. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down New York statute limiting bakers' working hours
on grounds that it interfered with their freedom to contract in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Board of Education.5 But if Roe is a lightning rod, Justice Blackmun
himself drew, almost all of its lightning. He personally received-and
read-over 70,000 letters regarding the opinion, many of them label-
ing him with the most vicious epithets. In addition to all this hate
mail, he has been picketed, threatened with death, and even targeted
by a bullet shot through his living-room window.6 Justice Blackmun
thus bore a high price for Roe, sacrificing his own right to privacy in
order to protect the privacy rights of others.
At times, Justice Blackmun seemed to regret his close connection
with Roe: "Author of the abortion decision," he once said, "We all
pick up tags. I'll carry this one to my grave."7 But while Roe is often
associated with Justice Blackmun, the Justice also appeared to identify
himself with this decision, as is evident in the unusually personal and
passionate tone of his dissents in cases where he felt the abortion right
to be under assault.8 In a poignant conclusion to his separate opinion
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,9 for example, Justice Blackmun
wrote:
In one sense, the Court's approach is worlds apart from that of
the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia. And yet, in another sense,
the distance between the two approaches is short-the distance
is but a single vote. I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this
Court forever, and when I do step down, the confirmation pro-
cess for my successor well may focus on the issue before us to-
day. That, I regret, may be exactly where the choice between
the two worlds will be made.'
0
Such statements suggest that, over the years, Justice Blackmun's own
sense of identity became intertwined with his opinion in Roe. Not
only did he define the boundaries of abortion law in this important
decision, the decision also played a critical role in defining him.
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that "separate but equal" public schools denied black
schoolchildren equality in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
6. See Harold Hongju Koh, Tribute to Harry A. Blackmun, 108 HARv. L. Rnv. 1, 10
(1994).
7. Blackmun Accepts Aftermath of Writing Abortion Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
1983, at A20. As Justice Blackmun predicted many years ago, this title (the author of Roe)
did in fact accompany him to his grave. See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Blackmun, Author
of Abortion Right, Dies: Judge, 90, Will Forever Be Linked to Issue in Roe v. Wade, N.Y.
TImEs, Mar. 5, 1999, at Al.
8. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 538 (1989) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (stating: "I fear for the future. I fear for the liberty and equality of the
millions of women who have lived and come of age in the 16 years since Roe was decided.
I fear for the integrity, and public esteem for, this Court.").
9. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
10. Id. at 943 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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But what exactly was at stake in this celebrated case? The actual
outcome of the case was that seven out of nine Supreme Court justices
voted to strike down a Texas statute making it a crime "to 'procure an
abortion' . . . except with respect to 'an abortion procured or at-
tempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother.""' In his opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun concluded
that the "right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass a wo-
man's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."'" Despite
the sage advice he had been given by his senior colleague Justice
Hugo Black "never [to] display agony,"' 3 Justice Blackmun openly ag-
onized over this decision in an unusually personal preface to the opin-
ion, stating:
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and
emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous
opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and
seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's
philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges
of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes to-
ward life and family and their values, and the moral standards
one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence
and to color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion.' 4
Such public agonizing reveals the painstaking conscientiousness
with which Justice Blackmun typically approached his judicial duties
and the heavy weight his responsibilities placed upon him. "We need
not resolve the difficult question of when life begins," he continued.
"When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philoso-
phy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary,
at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a posi-
tion to speculate as to the answer."" Nevertheless, the Justice ex-
pressed reluctance to leave this important question entirely open to be
resolved by the people of each state, reasoning: "we do not agree
that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of
11. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1973).
12. Id. at 153.
13. One decade later, Justice Blackmun stood by his introductory remarks, declaring:
I believe everything I said in the second paragraph of that opinion, where I ago-
nized, initially not only for myself, but for the Court. Parenthetically, in doing so
publicly, I disobeyed one suggestion Hugo Black made to me when I first came
here. He said, "Harry, never display agony. Never say that this is an agonizing,
difficult decision. Always write as though it's clear as crystal."
John A. Jenkins, A Candid Talk with Justice Blackmun, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 20, 1983, § b
(Magazine), at 26.
14. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
15. Id. at 159.
Fall 19981 THE AUTHOR OF ROE
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
the pregnant woman."16 To the contrary, some might say that the
Court proceeded to answer this question itself by holding that "the
word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not in-
clude the unborn."17
Although Roe found that the fetus is not a constitutional person,
it acknowledged the importance of the state's interests in preserving
the health of the pregnant woman and protecting potential human life,
and it balanced these competing interests by means of the famous tri-
mester framework. Dividing the nine months of gestation into three
trimesters, the Court determined that during the first trimester-
roughly the first three months of pregnancy-the abortion decision
must be left to the woman alone, in consultation with her physician.' 8
In the second trimester, the Court deemed the state's interest in the
health of the mother to be compelling because at that time the medi-
cal risks of abortion approach the risks of childbirth. Accordingly, the
Court held that the state may regulate second-trimester abortions in
order to safeguard the woman's health, requiring for example that
they be performed by specially licensed physicians or in a hospital
rather than in a clinic.' 9 The Court, however, drew the line at viabil-
ity-the point at which the fetus is "potentially able to live outside the
mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid"-which occurs at approxi-
mately 24 weeks after conception.2" In the third trimester, when the
fetus becomes viable, the Court ruled that the state may further its
compelling interest in potential life by completely proscribing abor-
tion "except when... necessary to preserve the life or health of the
[woman].'
This clinical approach to abortion, with its focus upon trimesters,
medical risks, and fetal viability,22 probably derives from Justice
Blackmun's previous experience as legal counsel for the Mayo Clinic,
one of the foremost medical facilities in the country. In his years at
the Mayo Clinic, the Justice developed a great deal of respect for doc-
tors and for the practice of medicine. In fact, earlier in his career, he
16. Id. at 162.
17. Id. at 158.
18. See id. at 163.
19. See idt
20. Id. at 160.
21. Id. at 163-64.
22. See Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology, 95 YALE Li. 639, 640 (1986)
(noting that "two medically determined times-the time when the hazards of abortion sur-
passed those of childbirth, and the time of fetal viability-appeared to form the structural
foundation of the Roe trimester framework").
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was himself torn between medical school and law school, and he
sometimes wished that he had taken the other road.
Many scholars have criticized Roe for its medical approach to
abortion. Professor Archibald Cox contends that the opinion "read[s]
like a set of hospital rules and regulations, whose validity [will] be
destroyed with new statistics upon the medical risks of childbirth and
abortion or new advances in providing for the separate existence of a
fetus."'  Andrea Asaro argues that Roe's emphasis upon the practice
of medicine is problematic because it "subsumed the woman's right to
privacy within the ambit of the doctor-patient relationship, and ulti-
mately subordinated her interest to [that of] the physician[ ].,,24 She
believes that the Court, in so doing, caused "the woman patient [to
take] a back seat to the male physician."'  Others have advanced the
related argument that Roe should have been grounded not in a wo-
man's privacy right to choose whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy in consultation with her physician, free from state interference,
but rather in the constitutional guarantee of equality.26 One such
critic is Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who observed many years ago,
when she was a judge on the federal court of appeals, that "Roe is
weakened... by the opinion's concentration on a medically approved
autonomy idea, to the exclusion of a constitutionally based sex-equal-
ity perspective." 27
As Justice Blackmun himself recognized some years later in his
dissent in Rust v. Sullivan,' however, "Roe v. Wade and its progeny
are not so much about a medical procedure as they are about a wo-
23. ARCHIBALD Cox, Tim RoLE OF THE SUPREmE COURT iN A~miERc.AN GOVERN-
NMENT 113-14 (1976).
24. Andrea Asaro, The Judicial Portrayal of the Physician in Abortion and Sterilization
Decisions, 6 HARv. WO~mN'S L. J. 51, 53-55 (1983).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Re-
lation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.L. REv. 375, 386 (1985); CATHARINE MAcKINNON, RoE v.
WADE: A Study in Male Ideology, in Abortion: Moral and Legal Perspectives 45-54 (1984)
(arguing that abortion is inextricably intertwined with the issue of gender inequality and
"criticiz[ing] the doctrinal choice to pursue the abortion right under the law of privacy");
Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 1569 (1979) (arguing that
laws forbidding abortion violate equal protection by imposing duties upon pregnant wo-
men that are at odds with a deeply rooted principle of American law, namely that individu-
als are not required to be good samaritans, volunteering their aid to others who are in
danger or in need of assistance); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Per-
spective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261
(1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Por-
nography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 CoLum. L. REv. 1 (1992).
27. Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 386.
28. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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man's fundamental right to self-determination. ' 29 The close connec-
tion between access to abortion and gender equality did not escape
Justice Blackmun, who was also the husband of a spirited woman, the
father of three strong daughters, and the mentor to many female law
clerks. In fact, on a Court in which women and minorities make up a
very small fraction of the total law clerk population, Justice Blackmun
stood out as the only Justice to have hired a majority of female clerks
in several different terms. At this very symposium, the Justice's fe-
male law clerks clearly outnumber the men-by nearly two to one.
Hence, Justice Blackmun undoubtedly understood the intimate rela-
tionship between a woman's right to reproductive autonomy and her
ability to participate equally in the economic, political, and social life
of the nation, and I believe that this understanding necessarily influ-
enced his decision in the case, although it was not made explicit in his
opinion for the Court.3"
Justice Blackmun was a pragmatist who consistently demon-
strated concern for the real world consequences of his decisions. Un-
like some others on the Court, his jurisprudence was grounded not
simply in legal theories, but rather in the way things actually work in
our society.31 Accordingly, he approached the question whether laws
prohibiting abortion violate the Constitution mindful of the fact that
the burden of such laws rests primarily upon women, especially poor,
minority, and under-age women.32 As a result, even though Roe os-
tensibly located the abortion right in the due process clause rather
29. Id. at 216 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
30. Of course, I do not know for sure whether Justice Blackmun fully understood the
relationship between abortion and sex equality at the time he authored Roe. All I can say
for certain is that he consciously made the connection in later years. In a 1986 speech, for
example, Justice Blackmun confessed that he viewed Roe "as a landmark in the process of
the emancipation of women." Greenhouse, supra note 7, at A19.
31. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying paragraph (arguing that Blackmun's juris-
prudence was driven not by abstract legal theories, but by concrete social realities).
32. As Professors Estrich and Sullivan point out, the impact of such laws is generally
borne by the most vulnerable women in our society:
History also makes clear that a world without Roe will not be a world without
abortion but a world in which abortion is accessible according to one's constitu-
tional caste. While affluent women will travel to jurisdictions where safe and
legal abortions are available, paying whatever is necessary, restrictive abortion
laws and with them, the life-threatening prospect of back-alley abortion, will dis-
proportionately descend upon "those without... adequate resources" to avoid
them. Those for whom the burdens of an unwanted pregnancy may be the most
crushing-the young, the poor, women whose color already renders them victims
of discrimination-will be the ones least able to secure a safe abortion.
Susan R. Estrich and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of
One, 138 U. PENN. L. REv. 119, 154 (1989) (citation omitted).
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than the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,33 I be-
lieve that Justice Blackmun's decision to protect that right was in-
formed by his appreciation of its importance to sex equality.34 Indeed,
his opinion relied heavily upon the significant disadvantages that may
be suffered by women denied the option to abort, including the physi-
cal and psychological harms of pregnancy, the stigma of unwed moth-
erhood, the distress associated with an unwanted child, and the
potential impact of maternity upon a woman's future life and career.3 5
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
34. Such an approach recognizes that due process and equal protection are not neces-
sarily in tension, that the two concepts may work in tandem. Liberty may benefit from an
awareness of inequality, while equality may expand with a truer understanding of the
meaning of liberty. Hence, the question whether the liberty protected by the due process
clause encompasses the right to an abortion gains an added dimension from awareness of
the fact that the burden of anti-abortion laws is borne disproportionately by poor, minor-
ity, and under-age women. Several cases illustrate this important insight. In Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), for example, the Court's decision to strike down an
Oklahoma statute authorizing forcible sterilization of certain classes of criminals seems to
be prompted in part by its concern that such laws often target poor persons and minorities.
The protection extended to the right to procreate thus flowed from the fear that govern-
ment might exercise the power to sterilize its citizens in a discriminatory fashion. See id at
541. The Court stated:
Marriage and Procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far reaching and
devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are
inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear .... [S]trict scrutiny of
the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwit-
tingly or otherwise invidious discriminations are made against groups or types of
individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.
Id. Similarly, in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), the Court's opinion invalidating
a Wisconsin law preventing marriage by those unwilling or unable to fulfill previous child
support obligations rested as much upon the unequal impact of such laws on the poor as it
did upon the importance of the right to marry. See id. at 395. See also Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a Virginia law prohibiting racial intermarriage violated both
the Due Process clause and the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
The same insight seems to underlie Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), which ruled that clear and convincing evidence of abuse or
neglect is necessary in order to terminate parental rights. See id. at 756. The protection
accorded to parents in that case was fueled by the Justice's fear that a lesser standard might
license judgments based upon class or cultural biases, with adverse consequences for the
parental rights of the poor, minorities, and other outsiders. See id. at 763. Cf Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), (Blackmun, J., concurring) (suggesting that illegal alien school-
children must possess the right to a free public education in order to prevent perpetual
caste hierarchies). In a famous article, however, Professsor Ira Lupu appears to quarrel
with such an approach: he contends that the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment should be viewed as separate and distinct, protecting in-
dependent values. See Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment,
77 MIcH. L. Rlv. 981 (1979).
35. Justice Blackmun enumerated in detail the detrimental consequences for women
forced to carry their pregnancies to term:
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This reading of Roe finds further support in Justice Blackmun's opin-
ion for the Court several years later in Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth,36 which intimated that the decision whether or not to have an
abortion must ultimately reside with women because they are dispro-
portionately affected by the adverse consequences of pregnancy,
childbirth, and maternity.37
Had the equality argument squarely been raised in Roe, however,
it is unlikely that a majority of Justices would have been willing to
strike down laws prohibiting abortion pursuant to the equal protection
clause. At that time, laws relating to pregnancy simply were not per-
ceived as a form of sex discrimination by the Supreme Court. In 1974,
just one year after Roe was decided, the Court upheld a California
insurance scheme that excluded pregnancy-related disabilities, reason-
ing that the different treatment accorded pregnant woman was not
sex-discriminatory, even though only women become pregnant, be-
cause the category of nonpregnant persons encompasses women as
well as men.38 An institution that failed to grasp the intimate relation-
ship between pregnancy and gender equality probably would not have
held that laws proscribing abortion discriminate against women. 39 In-
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be
involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a dis-
tressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physi-
cal health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned,
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child
into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In
other case cases... the difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood
may be involved.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
36. 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking down spousal consent requirement for abortions).
37. See id. at 71 (stating: "[t]he obvious fact is that when the wife and the husband
disagree on this decision, the view of only one of the two marriage partners can prevail.
Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly
and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her
favor.").
38. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (finding that the failure of a state
disability insurance system to cover pregnancy did not deny women equal protection). Cf.
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (holding that the exclusion of women
unable to work due to pregnancy or childbirth from disability coverage did not violate Title
VII).
39. In fact, some members of the current Supreme Court continue to dispute the view
that laws proscribing abortion discriminate against women. Cf. Bray v. Alexandria Wo-
men's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (holding that a conspiracy
to obstruct access to an abortion clinic did not involve class-based invidiously discrimina-
tory animus within the meaning of a federal civil rights law on the grounds that, although
"[a] tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews ... opposition to voluntary abortion cannot




deed, only in recent years has the Court explicitly acknowledged that
reproductive regulations may impede women in their quest for full
equality. In 1991, in a slightly different context, Justice Blackmun au-
thored a majority opinion concluding that a company "fetal protection
policy," which prohibited the hiring of fertile women in any jobs that
might potentially involve exposure to lead, constitutes sex discrimina-
tion in violation of Title VII 4° One year later, in his concurring opin-
ion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,41 the Justice finally made clear
the connection between abortion and equal protection, explaining:
A State's restrictions on a woman's right to terminate her preg-
nancy also implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equal-
ity .... By restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the
State conscripts women's bodies into its service, forcing women
to continue their pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and
in most instances, provide years of maternal care. The State
does not compensate women for their services; instead, it as-
sumes that they owe this duty as a matter of course. This as-
sumption-that women can simply be forced to accept the
'natural' status and incidents of motherhood-appears to rest
upon a conception of women's role that has triggered the pro-
tection of the Equal Protection Clause.4'
Moreover, even if Roe had concluded that laws banning abortion
amount to sex-based classifications, the Court still would have sus-
tained such laws under the most lenient standard of review.43 It is
easy to belittle Roe with the benefit of hindsight. But although the
equal protection basis for the abortion right has gained greater accept-
ance today,44 it is by no means clear that this position could have mus-
tered a majority of votes upon the Supreme Court in 1973.
40. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers
of America v. Johnson Controls, UAW, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991).
41. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
42. Id. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Until 1976, gender classifications received only rational basis review. The Court
did not hold that gender merits heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause
until Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny for the first time
to strike down an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of beer to males under 21 and
females under 18).
44. A careful reading of the Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey
suggests that there may now be five votes in support of an equal protection basis for the
abortion right. 505 U.S. at 852 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ). The
opinion suggested that a woman's
suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon
its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in the
course of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped
to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place
in society.
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Others have attacked Roe's mechanism for balancing the compet-
ing interests of pregnant woman, the fetus, and the state, asserting
that the trimester framework and the line drawn at fetal viability
make constitutional standards turn upon shifting medical technol-
ogy.45 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, for example, is often cited for
her catchphrase criticism that Roe is "on a collision course with itself"
because, as medical technology improves, fetal viability may advance
to an earlier stage of gestation whereas abortions may take place
safely later and later in the pregnancy.46 It is true that the fetus' abil-
ity to survive outside the womb depends to a certain degree upon the
state of medical technology, but there are also suggestions that viabil-
ity strikes an "anatomic threshold" at 23 weeks of gestation, for prior
to that time the crucial organs are not sufficiently developed to permit
extrauterine survival.47 For this reason, Justice Blackmun continued
to believe that "the threshold of fetal viability is, and will remain, no
different from what it was at the time Roe was decided [and that]
[p]redictions to the contrary are pure science fiction."4 8
In addition, although recent abortion decisions have effectively
abandoned the trimester framework,49 the viability line still stands
and, I believe, represents Justice Blackmun's lasting contribution to
abortion jurisprudence.50 In a cryptic statement, Roe draws the criti-
cal line at viability-the point at which the fetus is "capab[le] of mean-
ingful life outside [its] mother's womb."51 According to Professor
It; see also id. at 928 (Blackmun, J.) and id. at 912 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that
"Roe is an integral part of a correct understanding of both the concept of liberty and the
basic equality of men and women"). See also Ginsburg, supra note 26.
45. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 23.
46. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "[t]he Roe framework ... is clearly on a collision course with
itself. As the medical risks of various abortion procedures decrease, the point at which the
State may regulate for reasons of maternal health is moved further forward to actual child-
birth. As medical science becomes better able to provide for the separate existence of the
fetus, the point of viability is moved further back toward conception.")
47. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 554 n.9 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "there is an 'anatomic threshold' for fetal survival of about 23-24
weeks of gestation") (quoting Brief for the American Medical Association et al. as Amici
Curiae 7). See also Estrich et al., supra note 32, at 142 (describing conclusions of Fetal
Extrauterine Survivability, Report to the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law
3 (1988)).
48. Webster, 492 U.S. at 554 n.9.
49. See, e.g., id. at 518 (revising the trimester framework); see also Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) (rejecting the trimester framework).
50. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 870-71 (retaining and reaffirming the "central principle" of
Roe, namely "[tihe woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability").
51. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
[Vol. 26:21
Fall 19981 THE AUTHOR OF ROE
John Hart Ely, the Court's reliance upon fetal viability "mistake[s] a
definition for a syllogism." 52 Indeed, at first glance, the logic underly-
ing the line drawn at viability appears to be backwards: Roe per-
versely permits states to prohibit abortion and force women to carry
their pregnancies to term after viability-precisely the moment at
which the fetus is presumably capable of survival independent of its
mother.
Such criticisms, however, may justifiably be levied against viabil-
ity only if the concept is interpreted narrowly and equated solely with
technological survivability. Read more expansively, the viability line
possesses enduring significance because it is a multi-layered concept
that encompasses many meanings.53 Professor Laurence Tribe be-
lieves that the fetus' capacity for independent existence is important
because it marks the critical division between extraction of the fetus
from a woman's body and termination of its life, between abortion
and what is essentially infanticide:
Once the fetus can be severed from the woman by a process
which enables it to survive, leaving the abortion decision to pri-
vate choice would confer not only a right to remove an un-
wanted fetus from one's body, but also an entirely separate right
to ensure its death. ... [R]ecognition and enforcement [of the
latter right] would be indistinguishable from recognizing and en-
forcing a right to commit infanticide .... Viability thus marks a
point after which a secular state could properly conclude that
permitting abortion would be tantamount to permitting
murder.54
Professor Nancy Rhoden further spells out the significance of this
factor, reasoning that "[b]efore viability, removing an unwanted fetus
from the womb necessarily entails its destruction. After viability,
however, these dual functions of removal and destruction diverge.
55
By protecting the choice to terminate pregnancy only prior to viabl-
ity, when the fetus is completely dependent upon the woman for sur-
vival, the Court revealed intimate relationship between abortion and
bodily autonomy. Viability connects the embryo's or fetus' status with
its dependence upon the woman's body, thereby reaffirming the im-
portance of bodily integrity as a principle underlying the right to abor-
52. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 3, at 924.
53. Cf. Rhoden, supra note 22, at 672 (suggesting that viability "is what is known in
philosophy as a 'cluster concept'-a concept made up of several important components,
none of which is sufficient to define it.")
54. Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword" Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life
and Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1, 27-28 (1973).
55. Rhoden, supra note 22, at 666.
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tion. Indeed, this point is implicit in Roe itself, which traced the
genealogy of the constitutional right to privacy to Union Pacific Rail-
way Company v. Botsford,56 an early Supreme Court decision avowing
that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others."57
Others have argued that viability singles out the point at which
the fetus is capable of life outside the womb and thus independent of
its mother because it is reasonable to regard the fetus at that time as
no longer just a part of the woman, parasitic upon her, but rather as a
distinct being possessing interests in its own right.58 Professor Jed
Rubenfeld appears to advocate one version of this argument, noting
that "the concept of viability holds a strong normative pull" because it
marks the earliest moment at which a fetus may be deemed a constitu-
tional person. He argues that "[t]he advent of personhood is the mo-
ment when we regard the fetus as an end-in-itself, a distinct human
life-in-being. The effort to draw a line for this purpose should perhaps
be an effort to identify a moment when the fetus develops the capacity
for some sort of independent life in the world."59 In a related vein,
Professor Patricia King contends that the juridical status of the fetus
hinges upon whether or not it is viable because "the law has tradition-
ally considered the acquisition of a capacity for independent existence
to be the significant point in human development."60
Moreover, the concept of viability is imbued with additional
meaning because it roughly corresponds with several other important
factors in fetal development. First, if the focus is upon sentience (the
point at which a fetus first becomes a thinking, conscious being) medi-
cal evidence regarding brain development and electrical activity sug-
gests that this occurs somewhere between 19 and 30 weeks after
56. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
57. Id. at 251.
58. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (adhering to the viabil-
ity line because "the concept of viability... is the time at which there is a realistic possibil-
ity of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent
existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection
that now overrides the rights of the woman.").
59. Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition that "Life Begins at Concep-
tion," 43 STAN. L. REv. 599, 621 (1991).
60. Patricia A. King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection
of the Unborn, 77 MicH. L. REv. 1647, 1676 (1979).
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conception, which is around the time of viability.6 1 Rubenfeld also
observes this element, observing that "[v]iability occurs not only at the
time when the fetus' pulmonary capability begins, but also when its
brain begins to take on the cortical structure capable of higher mental
functioning," and arguing that "[t]hese two important developments
provide indicia both of independent beingness and of distinctly human
beingness."62 Second, viability may be important because it coincides
with late gestation, thereby affirming that the fetus' claim to societal
protection increases with advances in fetal development. 3 According
to Rhoden, at viability the fetus has reached a stage of development
such that it may be deemed close enough to an infant to merit consti-
tutional protection.64 Third, the viability line also tracks the English
and early American common law, which restricted abortion (if at all)
only after quickening-the moment at which perceptible movement
first occurs.65 Finally, by protecting abortion prior to viability while
permitting regulation after that time, the Court accommodates the in-
terests of both the pregnant woman and the fetus within her.66 In-
deed, viability is perhaps the only point at which a principled line may
be drawn during the continuum of pregnancy.67
Accordingly, Justice Blackmun struck a brilliant and ingenious
compromise by drawing the line at viability, an intermediate stage in
61. See Ken Martyn, Technological Advances and Roe v. Wade: The Need to Rethink
Abortion Law, 29 UCLA L. Rnv. 1194, 1207-10 (1982).
62. Rubenfeld, supra note 59, at 622-23.
63. Justice Stevens seems to be making a similar point in his concurring opinion in
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, which stated:
I should think it obvious that the State's interest in the protection of an em-
bryo ... increases progressively and dramatically as the organism's capacity to
feel pain, to experience pleasure, to survive, and to react to its surroundings in-
creases day by day. The development of a fetus B and pregnancy itself B are not
static conditions, and the assertion that the government's interest is static simply
ignores this reality.... [T]here is a fundamental and well-recognized difference
between a fetus and a human being .... And if distinctions may be drawn be-
tween a fetus and a human being in terms of the state interest in their protec-
tion ... it seems to me quite odd to argue that distinctions may not also be drawn
between the state interest in protecting the freshly fertilized egg and the state
interest in protecting the 9-month-gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of
birth. Recognition of this distinction is supported not only by logic, but also by
history and by our shared experiences.
476 U.S. 747, 778-79 (1986).
64. See Rhoden, supra note 22, at 671-72.
65. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 (1973).
66. See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 59 (arguing that women must be accorded
some reasonable amount of time to terminate their pregnancies, and that viability is a
workable place to draw this line).
67. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (suggesting that "there
is no line other than viability which is more workable").
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the course of pregnancy that correlates with a phase of fetal develop-
ment thought to be critical from the standpoint of several different
theories. Therefore, although the manifold meanings of viability may
not have been clearly elucidated in Roe, when untangled and ex-
plained they demonstrate that Justice Blackmun was correct in finding
the line drawn at fetal viability to possess "both logical and biological
justifications."6
Furthermore, Roe's emphasis upon viability portends well for fu-
ture privacy conflicts. The concept of viability gains new meaning
with the advent of modem medical technology that allows sperm and
egg to be united by means of in vitro fertilization in a laboratory, and
the resulting 4 to 8-celled embryos to be stored indefinitely in a
freezer. By limiting the abortion right to the stage prior to viability,
when the fetus cannot survive outside its mother's womb, Roe sug-
gests that the Constitution confers only a right to remove the fetus
from the woman's body, and not the corollary right to destroy the
fetus or embryo.69 In so doing, the opinion wisely leaves open addi-
tional questions, such as the status of extracorporeal embryos, which
may be deemed "viable" from the very moment of conception be-
cause they can exist indefinitely outside the womb.70 Viability thus
connects the embryo's or fetus' status with its dependence upon the
woman's body, thereby underscoring the importance of bodily integ-
rity as a principle underlying the right to abortion. Such a limitation is
wise in light of new developments in reproductive technology, which
implicate reproductive autonomy but not bodily integrity.7' Although
Justice Blackmun may not have contemplated a quarter-century ago
developments in medical technology that would some day enable indi-
viduals to genetically select embryos and fetuses or even reproduce by
means of cloning, he had the foresight to write Roe in a way that af-
fords the states substantial leeway to regulate these new reproductive
technologies.
Whether by chance or by choice, Justice Blackmun was assigned
many of the early abortion cases handed down in the years following
Roe. It is majority opinions in these cases that construct a considera-
ble body of privacy law, which is far too extensive for me to document
68. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
69. See Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MicI. L. Rav. 1473, 1484-85
(1995); see also Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Tech-
nology, 45 UCLA L. Rzv. 1077, 1114 (1998).
70. See Rubenfeld, supra note 59, at 620-21.
71. See Rao, Reconceiving Privacy, supra note 69, at 1112-13.
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in this commentary. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,72 he au-
thored the majority opinion striking down a Missouri law requiring
spousal consent and parental consent in order for married women and
minors, respectively, to obtain an abortion.73 Writing for the Court in
Colautti v. Franklin,74 Justice Blackmun found unconstitutional a
Pennsylvania statute requiring the physician to use the abortion tech-
nique that provided the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted
alive because it might require physicians to make a trade-off between
a pregnant woman's health and additional percentage points of fetal
survival.75 And in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists,76 Justice Blackmun again ruled for the Court that a
law mandating that women seeking abortions be provided with certain
information and requiring a second-physician in certain circumstances
to save the life of the fetus was unconstitutional. This body of law still
stands to the extent that it is consistent with the undue burden stan-
dard established by the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.7 7 Under this new standard, only regulations that amount to an
undue burden-those whose "purpose or effect is to place a substan-
tial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the
fetus attains viability"-are unconstitutional.7" Yet the abortion issue
is by no means settled, as is evident in recent efforts to enact laws
banning "partial-birth" abortions.79 Although Casey discarded some
parts of Roe, including the "rigid trimester framework,"80 other por-
tions of Roe survive and remain secure. Indeed, Casey expressly re-
tained and reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe, that "a State may
not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to termi-
nate her pregnancy before viability.""1 Accordingly, Justice Black-
mun's privacy jurisprudence will continue to frame the terms of future
conflicts.
72. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
73. See id. at 71, 74.
74. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
75. See id. at 400-01.
76. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
77. 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
78. IL
79. See, e.g., A.A. CODE ' 26-33-3 (1998); ARK. CODE ANN. ' 5-61-203 (1997); IDAHO
CODE' 18-613 (1998); ILL CoMP. STAT. ANN.' 720 ILCS 513/10 (1998); MICH. STAT. ANN.
' 14-15 (17016)(1998); MISS. CODE ANN. ' 41-41-73 (1998); MoNT. CODE ANN. ' 50-20-401
(1998); NEB. REV. STAT. ' 28-328 (1998); 21 OKLA. STAT. ' 684 (1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS. '
23-4, 12-2 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. ' 44-41-85 (1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAvS ' 34-23A-27
(1998); VA. CODE ANN. ' 18.2-74.2 (1998); W. VA. CODE ' 33-42-8 (1999).
80. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
81. Id. at 879.
Fall 19981
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Justice Blackmun's majority opinions were, however, constrained
by the need to obtain the necessary number of votes. Accordingly, we
must look to his separate opinions to hear his distinctive voice. In the
privacy area, several of these opinions are evocative of longstanding
themes in the Justice's constitutional jurisprudence. These opinions
reveal him to be a pragmatist, whose jurisprudence was grounded not
simply in abstract legal theories, but in concrete social realities. He
always immersed himself in the facts of the particular case before him.
Indeed, at oral argument, he would often pull out a huge map in order
to locate the particular geography of the situation. In his dissenting
opinion in Beal v. Doe, 2 for example, the Justice criticized the Court
for upholding a series of laws that prohibited the performance of non-
therapeutic abortions in public hospitals and that denied indigent wo-
men Medicaid funding for abortion, while covering the costs of
maternity, declaring:
The Court concedes the existence of a constitutional right but
denies the realization and enjoyment of that right on the ground
that existence and realization are separate and distinct. For the
individual woman concerned, indigent, and financially help-
less... the result is punitive and tragic. Implicit in the Court's
holdings is the condescension that she may go elsewhere for her
abortion. I find that disingenuous and alarming, almost reminis-
cent of: 'Let them eat cake.' .... There is another world 'out
there,' the existence of which the Court, I suspect, either
chooses to ignore or fears to recognize. And so the cancer of
poverty will continue to grow. This is a sad day for those who
regard the Constitution as a force that would serve justice to all
evenhandedly and, in so doing, would better the lot of the
poorest among us.
83
For Justice Blackmun, the existence and realization of constitutional
rights were not separate and distinct. He was always sensitive to the
real world consequences of the Court's decisions. Accordingly, in an-
other dissenting opinion, he objected to a law that would increase the
price of abortions by $40, explaining:
It is undisputed that this requirement may increase the cost of a
first-trimester abortion by as much as $40. Although this may
seem insignificant from the Court's comfortable perspective, I
cannot say that it is equally insignificant to every woman seek-
ing an abortion. For the woman on welfare or the unemployed
teenager, this additional cost may well put the price of an abor-
tion beyond reach. 4
82. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
83. Id. at 483 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84. Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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And in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,85 Justice
Blackmun would have struck down an Ohio law making it a crime to
perform an abortion upon an unmarried minor woman unless timely
notice was provided to one of the minor's parents. The majority
rested its holding upon the assumption that families are generally
warm and nurturing and that minors will usually benefit from the
compassionate advice of their parents. Once again acknowledging
that "there is another world out there," Justice Blackmun pointed out:
Sadly, not all children in our country are fortunate enough to be
members of loving families. For too many young pregnant wo-
men, parental involvement in this most intimate decision threat-
ens harm rather than promises comfort. The Court's selective
blindness to this social reality is bewildering and distressing....
The sexually or physically abused minor may indeed be 'lonely
or even terrified,' not of the abortion procedure, but of an abu-
sive family member. The Court's placid reference to the 'com-
passionate and mature' advice the minor will receive from
within the family must seem an unbelievable and cruel irony to
those children trapped in violent families.8 6
He concluded that it is "the unfortunate denizens of that world,
often frightened and forlorn" who require constitutional protection.87
Justice Blackmun understood that $40 is not an insignificant sum for
indigent individuals, and he acknowledged that some pregnant minors
may be trapped in abusive and violent families. His sheltered life of
privilege as a Supreme Court Justice did not blind him to these harsh
realities.
Indeed, Blackmun was the Justice who gave justice a human face,
recognizing the plight of the people behind the cases and consistently
advocating a compassionate reading of the expansive provisions of the
Constitution. Both of these characteristics are evident in his eloquent
dissent in DeShaney v. Winnebago County,88 which lamented the fate
of "poor Joshua," a child who was battered by his father and neglected
by the social service workers who failed to remove him from an abu-
sive environment. In that dissent, Justice Blackmun wrote:
Today, the Court purports to be the dispassionate oracle of the
law, unmoved by 'natural sympathy.' But, in this pretense, the
Court itself retreats into a sterile formalism which prevents it
from recognizing either the facts of the case before it or the
legal norms that should apply to those facts.... Like the ante-
85. 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
86. Id. at 536-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
88. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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bellum judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves, the Court to-
day claims that its decision, however harsh, is compelled by
existing legal doctrine. On the contrary, the question presented
by this case is an open one, and our Fourteenth Amendment
precedents may be read more broadly or narrowly depending
upon how one chooses to read them. Faced with the choice, I
would adopt a 'sympathetic' reading, one which comports with
dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion
need not be exiled from the province of judging. Poor Joshua!
Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cow-
ardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by [the social ser-
vice workers] who placed him in a dangerous predicament and
who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially
nothing except... 'dutifully record[ ] these incidents in [their]
files.' It is a sad commentary upon American life, and constitu-
tional principles-so full of late of patriotic fervor and proud
proclamations about 'liberty and justice for all'-that this child,
Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the remainder of
his life profoundly retarded.89
Some have criticized Justice Blackmun for his compassion, argu-
ing that his decisions were fueled by sentiment rather than by reason.
What these critics fail to understand is that pure logic divorced from
context and compassion may produce flawed results, while careful
concern for factual context and empathy for the plight of others may
lead to wisdom. Indeed, this insight is embodied in Justice Holmes'
famous aphorism that "the life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience.""
Justice Blackmun's compassion for the plight of "poor Joshua"
was typical of his concern for the real people behind the cases before
the Supreme Court, and this compassion often drove his decisions.
For example, his anxiety for the welfare of another young child who
was to be ripped from the arms of the only parents she had ever
known and returned to her biological family led him-to dissent from
the Court's denial of certiorari in a case called DeBoer v. DeBoer.91
During oral argument in another case involving the rights of biological
parents called Santosky v. Kramer, he was the only Justice who
thought to ask the lawyer representing the parents: "[W]hen was the
last time your clients saw [their] children?" 92 Despite his status as a
Supreme Court Justice, he empathized with the common person-the
89. Id. at 212-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
90. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Tim COMMON LAW, lecture 1, at 1 (1909).
91. 509 U.S. 983 (1993).
92. See Petitioners' Oral Argument at 10, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)
(No. 80-5889).
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poor, the underprivileged, and the oppressed. Perhaps this empathy
was born of his personal experience as the son of a grocer who worked
his way through Harvard College while his classmates enjoyed the
perks of their wealth and privilege: unlike many of his colleagues, Jus-
tice Blackmun was a scholarship student who supported himself in
college by taking various jobs-as a janitor, a milkman, a cowboy on a
dude ranch, a handball court painter, and a boat driver for the
Harvard crew club. And perhaps his empathy grew from his long-
standing association with the abortion issue, an issue which height-
ened his awareness of the plight in women in desperate circumstances,
particularly poor, minority and under-age women.
Roe marks the beginning of Justice Blackmun's historic career on
the Supreme Court, and it has clearly acted as a formative influence
upon the life of its author. Justice Blackmun shaped and was in turn
shaped by the abortion conflict. His close association with Roe
seemed to confer upon the Justice a special responsibility to serve as
the guardian of abortion rights. And his heightened sensitivity on this
issue often propelled other decisions, spawning entire areas of his ju-
risprudence. From his opinion in an abortion-related speech case,93
for example, Justice Blackmun derived his unique approach to the
commercial speech context.94 From his sympathy for the plight of
poor women and minors unable to obtain abortions without govern-
ment assistance, Justice Blackmun gained insight into the responsibil-
ity of government to protect those who are powerless.95 And from his
perspective upon reproductive autonomy, Justice Blackmun came to
understand that the right to privacy protects the sexual activities of
homosexuals as well as heterosexuals. 96 For this reason, any biogra-
phy of Justice Blackmun would be incomplete without consideration
of his opinion in Roe, the case that was a critical step in the career of a
"White Anglo-Saxon Protestant Republican Rotarian [Heterosexual]
Harvard Man from the Suburbs" 97 who ultimately became renowned
93. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
94. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Weighing The Listener's Interests: Justice Blackmun's
Commercial Speech and Public Forum Opinions, 26 HAsTINs CONST. L.Q. 165 (1998).
95. See generally DeShaney v. Wimnebago County, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
96. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986). See also Pamela S. Karlan,
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Justice Blackmun, 26 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 159 (1998).
97. Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal
Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLmm L. REv. 51 (1985) (citing Waltz, The Burger/Blackmun
Court, N.Y. TrmEs, Dec. 6, 1970, ' 6 (Magazine), at 61).
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as the champion of women, minorities, the poor, and other outsiders.
Although Harry A. Blackmun was the author of Roe, it should not
surprise that Roe itself played a critical role in writing the course of his
life.
